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instant case, such crediting is disallowed on the strict rule that
habeas corpus may only issue to determine the validity of deten-
tion under present sentence. It would therefore appear that the
lower court has in the instant case precluded the petitioner's suc-
cessful use of habeas corpus by restricting the writ issued to the
first sentence alleged to be void in the petition, and by failing to
consider the remainder.
S. J. B.
CRIMINAL LAW-LIMITATIONS ON USE OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN REGARD TO ALLOWANCE
OF CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED UNDER
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The impact of the Holland' decision on the substantive
rights of prisoners who have been sentenced under void convic-
tions has been brought into sharper focus by Smyth v. Midgett.2
Once again the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond,
Part II, had ruled in favor of a petitioner on a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to a prior sentence, and once again the
Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the judgment of the
lower court on this point.
In the Midgett case petitioner had been convicted on six
charges of grand larceny and two charges of housebreaking, re-
ceiving a two year sentence for each conviction. He had com-
pletely served three of the sentences for grand larceny and at
the time he petitioned for habeas corpus was serving the fourth
sentence. His remaining unserved sentences included the two
remaining grand larceny convictions and the two housebreaking
convictions, plus three subsequently incurred escape convictions
of one year each.
Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus challenged the validity, on
constitutional grounds, of the eight original convictions for grand
larceny and housebreaking. The Hustings Court ruled in favor
of petitioner, finding all eight convictions void and further or-
'See Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92 (1957) and comment therein supra,
p. 428.
2 199 Va. 727 (1958).
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dered that he be credited with the time served under the void
sentences on his three remaining escape convictions. By an al-
lowance of this credit, the Hustings Court found that the three
escape convictions were satisfied and the petitioner was ordered
released.
On review, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
l9wer court erred insofar as it gave petitioner credit for the three
prior completed sentences, in that it did not have jurisdiction to
determine the validity of sentences he had completely served
prior to the filing of his petition.
The Court's decision was based on a strict application of the
scope of the writ of habeas corpus. It held that habeas corpus
could not be used to review sentences already served but could
only inquire into the validity of the sentence under which the
petitioner was presently being detained. Therefore the lower
court could not give credit beyond the time served on the single
sentence for grand larceny that Midgett was serving at the time
of filing his petition.
The court relied on the Holland case in support of its de-
cision and to some extent seemed to feel that the present case was
little more than a re-hash of the Holland situation.3 Yet a close
reading of the Holland decision would indicate that the reason
for a reversal of that case was based on the fact that the trial
court issued the writ of habeas corpus on a prior completed
sentence.
From this view of the Holland case it would appear that the
possibility was still open for obtaining credit for a prior invalid
sentence if there were a presently void sentence which would give
life to a writ of habeas corpus.
Based on this rationale the Midgett case presented the court
with a legal question which had never been passed upon in Vir-
ginia, and an opportunity to further its equitable policy of
3 While Holland alleged that his present sentence was invalid the trial court
made no determination of this question, apparently on the theory that
the issue was immaterial, since the credit it was allowing for the prior
invalid sentence was adequate to grant Holland's immediate release.
granting credit for void convictions as established in the Stoze-
breaker4 and Fitzgerald5 cases.
In its reliance on the Holland case and its failure to point out
the suggested distinction the court has either overlooked this
possibility or regarded it as completely without merit and there-
fore unworthy of mention.
The effect of the Midgett decision is to greatly limit the
scope of the policy granting credit to prisoners who have suf-
fered invalid convictions.6 The Court has allowed itself to reach
this result by relying on the procedural limitations of the writ
of habeas corpus.
These limitations have the support of eminent and weighty
authority and such authority is not lightly disregarded.7  But
the writ of habeas corpus is basically founded upon principles of
equity and justice. No other form of action inherited from the
old English common law has such an impressive history in sup-
port of individual liberty.8 Such a writ should not be profaned
by allowing it to be used in reaching an unjust result.
The outcome of the Midgett holding, in its practical aspects,
has had little effect on the petitioner's freedom since the allow-
ance of credit from his present void sentence plus the time in-
volved in processing his appeal through the courts will very
nearly approximate the remaining time outstanding on the valid
escape convictions.
However, the Midgett case is certain to become a precedent
for future decisions. In placing a premium on strict adherence
to procedural limitations, the decision is open to criticism. It
cannot logically be argued that basic justice has been done when
4 Stonebreaker v. Smith, 187 Va. 205, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948) discussed
in preceding comment.
5Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 810 (1953), discussed in
preceding comment.
6 For a discussion of the general scope of this problem see Whalen, Re-
sentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the
Laws. 35 Minn.L.Rev. 239 (1951). And see Note, 45 Mich.L.Rev. 912
(1947).
739 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus §26, 9 Michie's Juris., Habeas Corpus §14, 15,
25 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus §55.
8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. 9, pp. 108-125, Vol. 10, p. 658.
a technicality in a procedure, which supposedly protects the in-
dividual, actually defeats the possibility of obtaining years of
freedom.9
The Court has not revealed its philosophy behind the hold-
ings in the Holland and Midgett cases. The Commonwealth's
argument submitted against allowing the lower courts to inquire
into prior convictions and grant credit was stated in its brief in
the Holland case:' 0
I If the court had jurisdiction to do this, it could ad-
judicate a traffic conviction, which previously detained
the petitioner and long since completed to be invalid
and apply the time served thereunder upon a murder
conviction upon which a prisoner might be serving.
Moreover, if the court had jurisdiction, it could apply
time served under one sentence twenty years ago (if
held invalid) and apply it to a current sentence. There
is no limit to the potential situations if once the strict
rules and principles of habeas corpus are abridged.
This type of reasoning is an affront to the intelligence of
our trial courts and is not consistent with the wide discretion
they already have in regard to the imposition of sentences.
Since the court rests its decision solely on the scope of
habeas corpus in this case, it may yet be possible to obtain a
future review fully considering the equities involved from the
standpoint of natural justice."'
The application of the writ of habeas corpus has not been
quite as strict as the Midgett opinion suggests. Credit has been
allowed for a prior void sentence on a writ of habeas corpus
i It is interesting to note that in the Holland case the petitioner had the
misfortune of being credited with time off for good behavior on his
first sentence. If he had served the full 25 years as originally pro-
nounced against him, then at the time he brought his petition for habeas
corpus he would still have been serving this first sentence and the writ
would have been effective to grant his release.
'I Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth, Smyth v. Holland, Record No.
4657, p. 4, 5.
21 For an interesting case in which the court feels compelled to circumvent
procedural formalities to insure a just result, see Lang v. State, 92
So.2d 670 (1957).
where the prisoner was serving a valid sentence at the time of
the petition.' 2 In an Iowa case, although the trial court erred on
its basis for sustaining the writ, the appellate court noted that the
petitioner had served time equivalent to the only valid sentence
against him and concluded that he was entitled to discharge by
some proceeding to that end, and granted immediate release.'
The Federal Rules have been held sufficiently flexible to allow
credit for a prior void sentence. 14
While these cases are only a sparse minority, it is submitted
that their reasoning has merit in regard to assuring substantial
justice to a prisoner who has served long years of confinement
under an invalid conviction.
This is not to discount the desirability of maintaining a
stable form of procedure in the face of "hard" cases. 15 But it is
the continual function of our system of law to develop the pro-
cedures by which the rights of the individual are kept in balance
with the judicial process. In this respect the Midgett decision
should cause reflection and debate over the proper ends to these
means.
P. T. W.
PROPERTY-DAMAGES FOR TIMBER TRESPASS
A 1957 case' decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia evidences that Virginia is in accord with the majority
of states and the Restatement views regarding the assessment of
damages for timber trespass.
The facts of the case show that the defendant, without per-
mission of the plaintiff, and in the face of repeated warnings that
he was trespassing on the plaintiff's land, cut and removed virgin
timber from the plaintiff's land, and manufactured it into lumber.
The defendant asserted that the cutting and removal was done
under an oral contract of sale. The contract referred to was
12 Ex Parte Bell, 256 S.W.2d 413, Tex.Cr.App. (1953).
Is Bennett v. Ha~lowell, 203 Iowa 352, 212 N.W. 701 (1927).
1 4 Ekberg v. U. S., 167 Fed.2d 380 (1948).
15 See dissent to Lang v State, supra, Note 11.
1 Barnes v. Moore, 199 Va. 227, 98 S.E.2d 683 (1957).
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